What I don’t understand is how they said screw the crown too. Are they not separate lighting systems? You’re telling me they’re interlinked like Christmas lights?
Does the developer or owner get their money back from the lighting company for a complete failure?
Maybe @TKDV knows.
I’m not really sure how refunds work after the fact, though there is often some stipulation in the contracts that covers this type of scenario.
Regarding the physical light fixtures themselves, its not inordinary for fixtures of this manner to be daisy chained, as are the ones at 270, but a single broken fixture shouldn’t cause everything to fail so the problem is probably much larger. The way these fixtures were integrated into the curtainwall may also probably be very difficult to access the fixture itself.
But the crown chandelier lighting, which was never installed, would not have been directly connected to the shearwall E/W lighting.
Thanks. But like the crown lighting should have definitely been a separate endeavor than the facade lighting right? Seems crazy that both don’t work.
Edit: nvm you answered in your edit
Sounds like a job for Alex Honnold
Where’s the smoke?
is this open to the public?
yup, all bonhams auction viewings are open to the public
That’s pretty incredible
Reading the article posted above. Good post -thanks.
The finances may not have ‘penciled out’- but the Architecture is still a magnificent ’stand out’.
There were many factors; but the issue with the cost overruns could have been obviated. One example of what cost could have been anticipated, and. accounted for is the “crane costs” .
Here is an excerpt from my AI query on the subject -
The description of 111 West 57th Street (Steinway Tower) as a financial “disaster” stems from a combination of prolonged legal warfare, major cost overruns, and severe restructuring that ultimately wiped out the original equity investors.
The core issues that plagued the development include:
Massive Cost Overruns
The construction of the world’s most slender supertall proved immensely complex and expensive. The project ran into severe budget overruns early on. For instance, a notable $50 million budget shortfall arose simply from omitting the massive, specialized crane costs required to construct a 1,428-foot tower on such a narrow footprint. By 2017, the senior mezzanine lender declared the loan “out of balance” because the anticipated completion costs vastly exceeded the remaining available funds.
Strict Foreclosure and Wiped-Out Equity
Because the project was out of balance, a junior mezzanine lender (Spruce Capital Partners) stepped in and initiated a strict foreclosure in 2017.
Unlike a traditional public auction where surplus value might return to the investors, a strict foreclosure allowed the lender to seize full control of the project’s equity in exchange for clearing a mere $25 million debt.
As a result, the original joint venture lost the project entirely, and the initial $70 million equity investment put in by the original backing partners was completely wiped out.
While the tower has since topped out, achieved completion, and seen several ultra-luxury condo sales, the original developers and backers view it as a financial disaster because the staggering cost of construction and subsequent foreclosure effectively obliterated their initial investments and profits.
End AI quote.
